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So at some point, the CAS Rules of Engagement were updated which prevented CAS aircraft from destroying ground targets that were +2km away from the AO/Side Mission that were not a threat to friendly aircraft. 2. the ONLY targets which can be engaged at free will are as follows: Enemy attack aircraft - attack helicopters and enemy jets Enemy ground vehicles which are outside the AO/Side Mission area that Pose a risk to other friendly aircraft, i.e 2km+ outside the objective area This change poses two problems: Risk to other friendly aircraft is ambiguous. The rule change seems to forget about the existence of friendly ground vehicles. Firstly, by adding the term "Risk to other friendly aircraft", you now have to consider what risk to said aircraft actually is. I find that there are two avenues in which you could classify something a risk to friendly aircraft, Armament and proximity, both of which incur their own problems as well. If we're classifying by armament, we have to ask what a threat actually is? 50. HMG? GMG? 30mm autocannon? Recoilless AT rifle? While some are definitely not a threat to aircraft, the fact that this even has to be asked produces a problem of lack of definition. We can also classify by proximity. It's very common for Transport pilots to determine a safe flight corridor, even if it is entirely unspoken. In which case, CAS can only engage ground vehicles if they are within said flight corridor, as by simple logic, if it isn't in range of friendly aircraft, then it isn't a problem. However, the dimensions of said flight corridor can also introduce ambiguity, while simply a vehicle that 2km+ away from the AO/Side does not. While this doesn't concern friendly transport aircraft at all, it easily transitions to the next critical problem. This entire rule change forgets about the existence of ground forces (Tanks, IFV's, light transport, etc.) and that random enemy ground patrols also affect them. While some vehicles can handle on their own, some depend on the existence of additional support, such as HEMMT's and other support vehicles. While this may not be a problem when your adversaries are HMG offroads and minigun qilins, When the threat is a T-140K Angara, there's a serious problem (Yes, they do exist.). No one has time to call CAS in. The unspoken interdiction that CAS provided was critical in ensuring that they get to safety if they didn't have any escort. Even if the ground patrols spawned in a spot where they never make contact with ground units, CAS blowing it up just to pass the time doesn't do any harm and is only at the expense of their own munitions. From this, we can sum up that the change to this rule has only introduced ambiguity, as well as just left commuting ground forces exposed without having their own escort. If someone performed a strike that potentially breaks this rule, said CAS pilot can perform any number of mental gymnastics to justify their attack, which only produces more problems than it solves. Now, we have to ask what the actual objective of this rule change was. The only one I can think of is that some CAS pilots were engaging targets that were deemed too close to the AO, and the proposed solution was to add additional guidelines for CAS to follow. To which I can retort that 2 KILOMETERS IS 2 KILOMETERS. If Pilots are engaging within this area, that isn't ambiguity, that's just plain breaking the rules. If everyone's breaking a clear law, It would be better to simply re-affirm your position and enforce said law, rather than introducing additional bits which make things worse. Other than that, I see no reason for this existing.
